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Safety Verification of a Fault Tolerant Reconfigurable Autonomous
Goal-Based Robotic Control System
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Abstract—Fault tolerance and safety verification of control
systems are essential for the success of autonomous robotic
systems. A control architecture called Mission Data System
(MDS), developed at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, takes
a goal-based control approach. In this paper, a method for
converting goal network control programs into linear hybrid
systems is developed. The linear hybrid system can then be
verified for safety in the presence of failures using existing
symbolic model checkers. An example task is simulated in
MDS and successfully verified using HyTech, a symbolic model
checking software for linear hybrid systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Autonomous robotic missions by nature have complex
control systems. In general, the necessary fault detection,
isolation and recovery software for these systems is cumber-
some and added on as failure cases are encountered in sim-
ulation. There is a need for a systematic way to incorporate
fault tolerance in autonomous robotic control systems. One
way to accomplish this could be to create a flexible control
system that can reconfigure itself in the presence of faults.
However, if the control system cannot be verified for safety,
the added complexity of the reconfigurability of a system
could reduce the system’s effective fault tolerance.
Mission Data System (MDS) is a software control archi-
tecture that was developed at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory
[1]. It is based on a systems engineering concept called State
Analysis [2]. Systems that use MDS are controlled by goals,
which directly express intent as constraints on physical states
over time. By encoding the intent of the robot’s actions,
MDS has naturally allowed more fault response options to
be autonomously explored by the control system [3].
A great deal of work to date has focused on detecting and
recovering from sensor failures in the control of autonomous
systems [4]. Several fault tolerant control architectures for
autonomous systems have been developed in which the
control effort is layered to deal with faults on different
levels, including low levels of hardware control and high
levels of supervisory control [5], [6]. Fault diagnosis can be
handled by modeling complex systems as stochastic hybrid
systems with modes that account for failure states. The
failures can then be detected using multiple-model based
hybrid estimation schemes [7] or by using variations of
traditional particle filters to aid in the accurate estimation
of low probability but high risk failure modes [8]. Although
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many fault tolerant control systems achieve reconfigurability,
few actually change the commands given to the system. One
system uses adaptive neural/fuzzy control to reconfigure the
control system in the presence of detected faults [9], and
another reconfigures both the control system design and the
inputs to the control system [10], although neither adjusts
the intent of the commands in response to failures.
One particularly useful way to model fault tolerant control
systems is as hybrid systems. Much work has been done on
the control of hybrid systems [11]. When the continuous
dynamics of these systems are sufficiently simple, it is
possible to verify that the execution of the hybrid control
system will not fall into an unsafe regime [12]. There are
several software packages available that can be used for this
analysis, including HyTech [13], UPPAAL [14], and VERITI
[15], all of which are symbolic model checkers. HyTech in
particular is used for checking linear hybrid automata, where
the dynamics of the continuous variables can be modeled
by linear differential inequalities that take the general form
of Ax˙ ≤ b [12]. Safety verification for fault tolerant hybrid
control systems ensures that the occurrence of certain faults
will not cause the system to reach an unsafe state.
In this paper, MDS is used as a goal-based control
architecture for a representative robotic task involving sensor
failures and goal re-elaboration. The major contribution of
this paper is the extension of a process to convert com-
plex goal networks with several state variables and goal
elaborations into hybrid automata that can be verified for
safety using existing symbolic model checking software. An
example goal network is developed in MDS, converted to a
hybrid automaton, and then verified in the presence of sensor
failures. A more detailed description of this work is available
as a technical report [16].
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section II
summarizes important concepts of MDS which pertain to
this work. Section III introduces the example task, system
design, and goal network. Section IV describes the major
contribution of this work, the general process for converting
goal networks into hybrid automata. Section V returns to
the example, discussing simulation results as well as the
hybrid automata that were created and the results of the
safety verification. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper
and discusses future directions of research.
II. MISSION DATA SYSTEM OVERVIEW
A. State Analysis
State Analysis is a systems engineering methodology that
focuses on a state-based approach to the design of a system
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[2]. In State Analysis, the control system and the system
under control are considered separately. Models of state
variable effects in the system under control are used for
such things as the estimation of state variables, control of
the system, planning, and goal scheduling. State variables
are representations of states or properties of the system that
are to be controlled or that affect a controlled state. Examples
of state variables could include the position of a robot, the
temperature of the environment, the health of a sensor, or
the position of a switch.
Using State Analysis, the state variables of the system
under control are identified. A model of the system under
control is developed and controllers and estimators are
designed using the models. Goals and goal elaborations
are created, also based on the models. Goals are specific
statements of intent used to control a system by constraining
a state variable in time. Goals are elaborated from a parent
goal based on the intent and type of goal, the state models,
and several intuitive rules, as described in [2].
B. Mission Data System
A core concept of State Analysis is that the language used
to design the control system should be nearly the same as the
language used to implement the control system. Therefore,
the software architecture, MDS, is closely related to the
systems engineering theory described above.
Data structures called software state variables are central
to MDS [17]. A state variable can contain much information;
for example, a position state variable for a robot in the
plane could contain the robot’s (x,y) position, its velocity
in component form, and uncertainty values for each piece of
information. Each state variable has a unique estimator, and
if necessary, a controller. Goals can be created that constrain
some or all of a state variable’s information. For example, a
goal could constrain the velocity of the position state variable
used in the previous example, but could leave the position
or uncertainties unconstrained.
Goal networks replace command sequences as the control
input to the system. Goal networks consist of a set of goals
with their associated starting and ending time points and
temporal constraints. A goal may cause other constraints to
be elaborated on the same state variable and/or on other
causally related state variables. These goals must have an
associated elaboration class. The elaboration class instructs
the elaborator in MDS to add certain goals to the goal
network in support of the parent goal. The goals in the goal
network and their elaborations are scheduled by the scheduler
software component so that there are no conflicts in time,
goal order or intent. The scheduled goals are then achieved
by the estimator or controller of the state variable that is
constrained.
Elaboration allows MDS to handle tasks more flexibly
than control architectures based on command sequences. One
example is fault tolerance. Re-elaboration of failed goals is
an option if there are physical redundancies in the system,
many ways to accomplish the same task, or degraded modes
of operation that are acceptable for a task. The elaboration
Fig. 1. Simulated robotic task
class for a goal can include several pre-defined tactics. These
tactics are simply different ways to accomplish the intent
of the goal, and tactics may be logically chosen by the
elaborator based on programmer-defined conditions. This
capability allows for many common types and combinations
of faults to be accommodated automatically by the control
system [3].
III. EXAMPLE TASK DESIGN
This section describes the design of an autonomous robotic
system, task, and a goal network that will accomplish the task
in the presence of sensor failures. This example illustrates
some of the MDS principles outlined in the previous section.
A. Task Design
An autonomous robotic task is considered in which a
simulated robot with several sensors follows a path within a
given uncertainty bound. The task could be compared to a
Mars scientific mission that has two points of interest (p1 and
p2); the first is more desirable but needs a lower uncertainty
in the robot’s position to reach it. The mission is considered
a success if the robot does not wander off the path (where it
could be damaged or get stuck), and the mission is completed
if the robot reaches either point of interest. As shown in
Figure 1, the planned route for the simulation consists of
two checkpoints, c1 and c2; after the first checkpoint, c1,
there are two possibilities for the location of c2, p1 and p2.
The first of these possibilities, p1, lies down a path that has a
somewhat tighter error bound and requires a higher standard
of sensor health. The other possibility, p2, lies down a second
path that allows for a larger error bound and a somewhat
degraded sensor capability.
The path is successfully navigated by the robot if the
robot stays within the path boundaries, representing the error
bounds allowed down each path. Completion of the task
occurs when the robot navigates to and stops sufficiently near
c2 without breaching the boundary. The second checkpoint,
c2, is first assigned to be at location p1, but can be changed
to be p2 upon the failure or degradation of critical sensors.
B. System Design
The robot used in this simulation is equipped with three
sensors: differential GPS, LADAR, and odometry (the col-
lection of position, orientation, and velocity information
deduced from wheel encoders). These three sensors are
854
Authorized licensed use limited to: CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY. Downloaded on April 14,2010 at 20:32:27 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
Fig. 2. State effects diagram; solid ovals represent state variables and
dashed ovals represent derived state variables.
used to estimate the robot’s position, orientation, and ve-
locity information. Several obstacles were placed in the
environment to facilitate the use of the LADAR. The scan
matching algorithm developed by Lu and Milios [18], which
outputs position and orientation, was adapted for use in this
simulation.
Several state variables are needed to describe this system.
First, the position state variable tracks Cartesian and angular
position and velocity, as well as the covariance matrices for
the estimates. Three state variables describe the health of the
three sensors as GOOD, FAIR, POOR, or FAILED. Using
the same labels, the health of the overall sensing system for
this specific task is described by the system health derived
state variable [17]. The state effects diagram is shown in
Figure 2. The health of the sensors affect the knowledge
of the robot’s position, and so the system health indirectly
affects the knowledge of the robot’s position and orientation.
Since this state effect exists, it is possible for goals on the
position state variable to elaborate constraints on the system
health state variable.
The robot’s position and orientation are estimated using
a multiple model-based method [19]. In order to make the
estimation algorithm robust to changes in sensor availability
and health, different Kalman filters were designed for each
possible combination of sensors. This approach was chosen
for its relative simplicity and ease of implementation. The
three sensor health variables are estimated using a different
process. In each sensor’s health estimator, the output of the
sensor is converted to a measured position and velocity value
and is compared to the other sensor’s outputs. Then, a voting
scheme is employed to determine the health of the sensor.
Once a sensor is failed, it is assumed to always be failed.
The system health derived state variable is estimated using
the three sensor health state variables. The system health
decays in a specific way as the sensor health values decay.
C. Goal Design
The goal network associated with this task consists of the
elaboration of one overall goal, and can be seen in Figure
3. The goal is a maintenance goal on the position of the
robot, called BeAt1or2Goal, which refers to locations p1
and p2 respectively. This goal elaborates into two goals
on the robot’s position, GetToC1Goal and GetToC2Goal.
The first, GetToC1Goal, tells the robot to move to the first
checkpoint, c1. The second goal, GetToC2Goal, has two
Fig. 3. Goal network and elaborations; the “GetTo” goal elaboration is
relevant to the GetToC1, GetToP1, and GetToP2 goals. The dots before and
after the goals are beginning and ending time points, respectively. Vertical
lines between time points indicate that the time points are constrained to fire
at the same time. Dashed lines under a goal indicate that the goals below
it are elaborated from it.
tactics it can elaborate; the first is GetToP1Goal and the
second tactic is GetToP2Goal. These goals tell the robot to
drive to the second checkpoint, which is either p1 or p2. The
“GetTo” goals (except GetToC2Goal) elaborate goals con-
straining the system health state variable to be certain values.
GetToP1Goal elaborates a concurrent goal constraining the
system health to be GOOD and also elaborates a preceding
goal that constrains the system health to be GOOD. The
GetToC1Goal and GetToP2Goal both elaborate concurrent
goals constraining the system health to be FAIR or better.
Initially, the GetToC2Goal elaborates to the GetToP1Goal.
If the system health degrades so that it is less than GOOD
before reaching the opening time point of the GetToP1Goal,
the preceding system health goal will fail, causing a re-
elaboration of the GetToC2Goal, which then elaborates the
GetToP2Goal. However, if the system health degrades to
less than GOOD while achieving the GetToP1Goal, the fault
response is instead to stop the robot and go into system
safing mode. The same response occurs if the system health
degrades to less than FAIR while achieving the GetToC1Goal
or the GetToP2Goal.
IV. SAFETY VERIFICATION
Hybrid system analysis tools can be used to verify the
safe behavior of a hybrid system; therefore, a procedure to
convert goal networks into hybrid systems is an important
tool for goal network verification. The procedure described
in this section allows certain structures of goal networks to
be converted into simple, linear hybrid automata in a general
way. There are few restrictions on the goal networks; they
can constrain several state variables, which may be linearly
related to each other, and they can have goals with several
tactics. The amount of time needed to complete a goal can
be constrained or unconstrained, and elaboration logic can
be based on the state variable, affecting or affected state
variables, order, and time. However, goal tactics that have
constraints on controllable state variables must not introduce
time points that occur during a goal on a controllable state
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variable that has transition conditions that depend on com-
pletion. This type of goal is called unsplittable. Also, goals
in the network must have a unique ordering or scheduling,
though several goals can be active concurrently as long as
the goals on the same state variable are mergeable.
The first part of the procedure is to prepare the goal
network by elaborating out all tactics of the goals in the
given scheduled goal network, numbering all the time points,
grouping together goals that are active between consecu-
tive time points, and labeling all state variables that are
constrained in the goal network. State variables are placed
into three categories: controllable, uncontrollable, and de-
pendent. Controllable state variables (CSVs) are directly
controllable and are always associated with a command class.
Uncontrollable state variables (USVs) are not associated with
a command class in any way. Dependent state variables
(DSVs) do not have an associated command class, but have
modeled dependencies on controllable state variables.
The rest of the process for converting goal networks into
hybrid automata has several parts. The first describes how
to create an automaton based on the control system for all
the CSVs and continuous DSVs in the goal network. The
next part outlines the creation of other automata based on
the models of each discrete DSV and each USV. Finally,
the verification of the hybrid system is the last part of the
process. The process is described fully in [16], and the main
points are summarized here.
For the first automaton created from the CSVs and con-
tinuous DSVs, the following steps summarize the procedure:
1) In each group, create locations (modes) by combining
branch goals (goals on CSVs that are not ancestors
of other goals on CSVs in the group) with all parent
and sibling goals (goals in the same tactic or other
root goals) that constrain CSVs. Label each location
with the dynamical update equations on all CSVs and
continuous DSVs constrained in the location. Create
Success and Safing locations.
2) Create elaboration and transition logic tables for each
goal that elaborates any constraints on CSVs and for
each CSV, respectively. Outlines for these tables are
shown in Table I and Table II.
3) Create transitions between locations and groups using
the logic outlined in the tables from the previous step.
Elaboration logic controls the transitions into groups
and the failure transitions from each location, and
transition logic controls the transitions out of a group
to the next group or to the Success location.
4) Add exit and failure transitions based on time to loca-
tions containing goals that have time constraints. Add
entry actions that reset the time variable to transitions
into these locations from the group connector.
5) Remove unnecessary locations, groups, and transitions.
For discrete DSVs and all USVs, create a separate hybrid
automaton for each.
1) Create a location in each automaton for each discrete
state of the discrete DSV or USV used in the CSV
TABLE I
OUTLINE OF AN ELABORATION LOGIC TABLE
Tactic Starts in Fail to Fail Conditions
1
2
:
TABLE II
OUTLINE OF A TRANSITION, SUCCESS, AND FAILURE LOGIC TABLE
From Unc Maint Cntl ... Success Fail
Unconstrained
Maintenance
Control
:
automaton (or discrete sets of continuous states, for
continuous USVs).
2) Create transitions and transition conditions between the
locations that correspond to the modeled behavior of
the state variable.
3) Parameterize transitions of stochastic uncontrollable
state variables for verification.
Finally, for the verification of the system, each automaton
must be converted into a form suitable for the verification
software (which is simply a syntax issue) and transitions
in the discrete DSV and USV automata and the affected
transitions in the CSV automaton must be synchronized.
The last step of the procedure before safety verification
is establishing the “incorrect” or “unsafe” sets, which are
system conditions that should never be true.
V. EXAMPLE RESULTS
Returning to the example task and goal network described
in Section III, this section will describe the MDS simulation
of the task as well as the safety verification of this example.
A. Simulation
The robotic simulation environment consists of three
software packages. The autonomous robotic control system
was implemented in MDS, and an open-source 3-D robotic
simulation package called Gazebo was used to simulate the
environment, the robot, and its sensors. An open-source
server package called Player was used to interface between
the hardware adapter in MDS and the simulated robot in
Gazebo [20].
1) Results: The robotic task was simulated in a nominal
case and in several sensor failure and degradation cases.
Sensors were failed and degraded by intercepting the sensor
measurement values supplied by Gazebo and setting them to
modified values. Each of the failures and degradations were
introduced at five different time points during the task.
The nominal case performed exactly as expected, as seen
in Figure 4. The health of the system and sensors remains
high throughout the run, and the checkpoints are achieved
in order, with checkpoint c2 occurring at p1, which has the
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Fig. 4. Nominal case: a) position, b) health variables
Fig. 5. Robot position in a GPS failure case
narrower error bound. The LADAR and odometry failure and
degradation cases were similar to the nominal case in that
each case was successful and the route to c2 occurring at p1
was completed in each case.
Nearly all of the GPS failure and degradation runs were
completed successfully. For the runs in which the failure
or degradation occurred before the GetToP1Goal became
active, the re-elaboration of the GetToP2Goal was triggered
and the robot completed the task by reaching p2, as seen
in Figure 5. (For one of these runs, the re-elaboration was
not triggered soon enough before the transition to the next
goal, and therefore, the outcome was the failure of the
GetToP1Goal, causing safing). For the runs in which the
failure or degradation occurred after the GetToP1Goal had
started, the result was immediate goal failure and safing.
These results show that the simulation of the system
successfully represents the designed behavior of the system.
B. Safety Verification
1) Hybrid System Design: Using the rules outlined in
Section IV, the goal net for this example was converted to
a hybrid system. The CSV automaton was developed from
Fig. 6. Hybrid automaton for the position state variable; SHG, SHF, SHP
is system health is GOOD, FAIR, and POOR, respectively; “done” indicates
that the position state variable has achieved its constraint.
Fig. 7. Hybrid automaton for the system health state variable
the “GetTo” goals constraining the position state variable,
and is represented in Figure 6. The first location entered
is GetToC1; from this location, transitions to Safing (via
failure logic) or to the next group (via transition logic)
are possible. The second group has two locations in it,
GetToP1 and GetToP2. Once the system transitions out of
GetToC1, elaboration logic dictates which location (either
GetToP1 or GetToP2) is entered. Transitions from either of
these locations are to the Success (transition logic) or Safing
(failure logic) locations.
The automaton for the USV, the system health state
variable, has locations that are based on the three discrete
values of the system health that affect the position state
variable’s automaton. As seen in Figure 7, the transition
conditions are stochastic and parameterized for verification.
2) Results: HyTech, a symbolic model checking software
that can analyze simple linear hybrid systems, was used to
verify this system [13]. The automata for the position and
system health state variables were encoded and synchronized
(see Figure 8). The rates of degradation of the system
health are the parameters that the safety verification search
is conducted over, and these parameters are represented by
α and β in Figures 8 and 7. The decay of the health of the
system from GOOD to FAIR occurs when the health variable
reaches a value of α and the transition from FAIR to POOR
occurs when the system health variable reaches a value of
β . The system health variable increases at any rate between
zero and one (s˙∈ [0,1]). The rest of the model is as described
above.
The initial conditions for the system are starting in the
GetToC1 location for the position and GOOD for the system
health. The “unsafe” set used for this analysis consists of four
different regions: 1) position in Safing and health is Good;
2) position in GetToC1 and health is POOR; 3) position
in GetToP1 and health is not GOOD; and 4) position in
GetToP2 and health is POOR. Forward analysis from the
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Fig. 8. HyTech code excerpt for position and system health automata in
example problem. Note the synchronization between the decay of the system
health and the transitions between position locations.
initial conditions was used. HyTech found that there are no
values of α or β that would cause the system to go into
any of the unsafe regions. A more complicated example that
was verified using a less capable version of the conversion
procedure can be found in [21].
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper describes a systematic way to verify goal
networks using a general procedure to translate certain types
of goal networks into linear hybrid systems. A software
package specializing in the analysis of linear hybrid systems
can then be used to verify the safety of the system. The
process was used successfully on a simple example problem,
though due to the way multiple controllable and continuous
dependent state variables are handled by the process, it is
likely that this procedure will easily handle more complicated
problems. This result is important for the development and
use of reconfigurable goal networks as a method to robustly
control complex embedded systems.
Future work includes the proof and automation of this
procedure to translate goal networks to hybrid systems. It
may also be possible to extend this procedure to apply to
even more complex goal networks by using certain MDS
attributes, like projections based on state models, in the tran-
sition conditions of the hybrid automata. Another extension
would be to include estimation uncertainty of uncontrollable
state variables in the verification procedure.
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